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ABSTRACT. Subjective probabilities play a role in many economic decisions. There is a large
theoretical literature on the elicitation of subjective probabilities, and an equally large empirical
literature. However, there is a gulf between the two. The theoretical literature proposes a range of
procedures that can be used to recover subjective probabilities, but stresses the need to make strong
auxiliary assumptions or “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports in order to recover the latent
probability. With some notable exceptions, the empirical literature seems intent on either making
those strong assumptions or ignoring the need for calibration. We illustrate how one can jointly
estimate risk attitudes and subjective probabilities using structural maximum likelihood methods. This
allows the observer to make inferences about the latent subjective probability, calibrating for
virtually any well-specified model of choice under uncertainty. We demonstrate our procedures with
experiments in which we elicit subjective probabilities. We calibrate the estimates of subjective
beliefs assuming that choices are made consistently with expected utility theory or rank-dependent
utility theory. Inferred subjective probabilities are significantly different when calibrated according to
either theory.
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Subjective probabilities about some event are operationally defined as those probabilities that
lead an agent to make certain choices over outcomes that depend on that event. These choices could
be as natural as placing a bet on a horse race, or as structured as responding to the payoffs provided
by some scoring rule. In order to infer subjective probabilities from observed choices of this kind,
however, one either has to make some strong assumptions about risk attitudes or jointly estimate
risk attitudes and subjective probabilities. We show how the latter can be implemented by pairing
several choices together, some of which identify risk attitudes and some of which identify the
interplay between risk attitudes and subjective probabilities. Joint estimation of a structural model of
choice across these two types of tasks allows one to then make inferences about subjective
probabilities.
If inferred subjective probabilities are conditioned on knowing risk attitudes, then any
statistical uncertainty in the estimation of risk attitudes would be expected to “propagate” into some
additional uncertainty about subjective probabilities. Joint estimation allows these effects to occur,
providing more reliable estimates of subjective probabilities, even if those estimates have large
standard errors. In other words, it is possible that the choice task for eliciting subjective probabilities
generates a point response that appears to be quite precise by itself, but which is actually not a very
precise estimate of the latent subjective probability when one properly accounts for uncertainty over
risk attitudes.
An important example is the response to a proper scoring rule, such as the quadratic scoring
rule (QSR). A respondent might select 67% when faced with a QSR, and that would be the exact
subjective probability if the subject were known to be exactly risk neutral. But if the subject was
estimated to have risk attitudes in some interval, there would be a corresponding range of subjective
probabilities to be inferred from that 67% response to the scoring rule task. If the estimate of the
subject’s risk attitudes spanned the possibility of risk neutrality, then the inferred subjective
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probability would include 67%, but would also include subjective probabilities on either side. If the
estimate of the subject’s risk attitudes revealed him to be clearly risk averse, with no statistically
significant chance of being risk neutral, then the risk-adjusted subjective beliefs would actually be
strictly higher than 67%. The intuition is clear: a response of 50% in the standard QSR removes all
uncertainty over payoffs, and is a magnet for risk averse subjects. Sufficiently risk averse subjects
would report close to 50% even if their latent subjective probability was 67%. So if we observe the
subjects responding at 67%, and we know that they are risk averse to some degree, then we can infer
that they must have actually held a latent subjective probability greater than 67% and responded to
the pull of the magic 50% magnet.
Formalizing this intuition requires that one obtain estimates of risk attitudes from a task with
objective probabilities as well as from a task whose outcomes depend on some subjective probability,
and then untangles the effects of risk attitudes and subjective probability with a structural model of
choice. We do so for the QSR, and also for a linear scoring rule (LSR).
In section 1 we briefly state the theory underlying our approach. The properties of the QSR
and LSR, and the fact that responses to these are affected by risk attitudes, are well known. We
assume throughout that the agent is acting in what is called a “probabilistically sophisticated”
manner, although we do not restrict the characterization of risk attitudes to expected utility theory
(EUT). We also consider the inference of subjective probability for a subject who is assumed to
make decisions according to the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model. This extension is particularly
appropriate in the case of eliciting subjective probabilities, because it involves allowing for
probability weighting and non-additive decision weights on the utility of final outcomes. Given that
one of these probabilities to be weighted is the subjective probability being estimated, one might
expect estimates of the subjective probability to be sensitive to the correct specification of the model
of risk attitudes employed.
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In section 2 we describe the experimental task we posed to 140 subjects, split roughly equally
across the QSR and LSR alternatives. Our subjects made choices over a number of standard
lotteries, characterized by objective uncertainty over monetary outcomes between $0 and $100. They
also gave responses to either a QSR or LSR choice task. The prizes on each of these scoring rule
tasks also spanned $0 and $100, so that we were able to infer risk attitudes over the same prize
domain as the scoring rule responses.
Section 3 formally sets out the econometric model used for estimating subjective
probabilities, spelling out the manner in which we undertake joint estimation over all tasks in order
to identify subjective probabilities. Section 4 then presents our estimates of the inferred subjective
probabilities from these scoring rules, after adjusting for risk. We show how QSR and LSR results in
subject responses which are far from the subjective probabilities one would a priori expect, but when
inferring the subjective probabilities conditioned on the joint estimation or risk preferences and
subjective probabilities the responses gives responses in line with intuition. 
Section 5 reviews related literature, and some extensions to consider the case of subjective
uncertainty, where the subject is not assumed to have “boiled down” his subjective belief into a crisp
subjective probability. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
1. Scoring Rules
Scoring rules are procedures that convert a “report” by an individual into a lottery defined
over the outcome of some event. For simplicity we assume throughout that the events in question
only have two outcomes. A scoring rule asks the subject to make some report r, and then defines
how an elicitor pays a subject depending on their report and the outcome of the event. This
framework for eliciting subjective probabilities can be formally viewed from the perspective of a
trading game between two agents: you give me a report, and I agree to pay you $X if one outcome
1 The more general version of the log scoring rule (Bernardo and Smith [1994; p. 73]) is a state-
dependent linear transformation of the simple log score:  k(s) + J × log [b(s)/2(s)], where b(s) is a probability
report for state S=s from a discrete set of states and a probability mass function b=[b(1), b(2),....b(n)] such
that  b(s)>0,  3S b(s)=1; 2(s) can be thought of as a reference probability report such that 2(s)>0,  3S 2(s)=1;
and k(s) and J>0 are constants.
2 That is, 1=1 if A occurs, and 1=0 if it does not occur.
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occurs and $Y if the other outcome occurs. The scoring rule defines the terms of the exchange
quantitatively, explaining  how the elicitor converts the report from the subject into a lottery. We use
the terminology “report” because we want to view this formally as a mechanism, and do not want to
presume that the report is in fact the subjective probability B of the subject. In general, it is not.
For example, consider the log scoring rule proposed by Good [1952;  p.112] and extended
by Bernardo [1979]. In its simplest version, this scoring rule assigns a number, log(2), to the report
2 for some event, constraining 2 to lie in the unit interval. Hence we can refer to this as a reported
probability. Since 0#2#1, the simple log score is a penalty score, a negative number. Also, since the
log function is increasing, higher reported probabilities 2 for an event receive higher scores (lower
penalties), with a maximum score (minimum penalty) of zero when the reported probability for the
event that occurs is 1, i.e, 2=1.1
The popular QSR is defined in terms of two positive parameters, " and $ that determine the
fixed reward the subject gets and the penalty for error. Assume that the possible outcomes are A or
B, where B is the complement of A, that 2 is the reported probability for A, and that 1 is the true
binary-valued outcome for A.2 Then the subject is paid S(2|A occurs) = " - $(1-2)2 = " - $(1-2)2 if
event A occurs and S(2|B occurs) = " - $(1-2)2 = " - $(0-2)2 if B occurs. In effect, the score or
payment penalizes the subject from the squared deviation that an omniscient seer would report in
these two cases, which is 1 and 0, respectively. The fixed reward is a convenience to ensure that
subjects are willing to play this trading game, and the penalty function simply accentuates the penalty
from not being an omniscient seer. In our experiments " = $ = $100, so subjects could earn up to
3 There exist mechanisms that will elicit subjective probabilities without requiring that one correct for
risk attitudes, such as the procedure proposed by Karni [2009]. However, it is not apparent that the rationale
to truthfully report can be easily explained to subjects, or that the incentives for truthful reporting are strong
in the neighborhood of the true subjective probability. These behavioral properties of the procedure should
be explored in controlled comparisons with more traditional scoring rules, such as the QSR.
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$100 or as little as $0. If they reported 1 they earned $100 if event A occurred or $0 if event B
occurred; if they reported ¾ they earned $93.75 or $43.75; and if they reported ½ they earned $75
no matter what event occurred.
It is intuitively obvious, and also well known in the literature (e.g., Winkler and Murphy
[1970] and Kadane and Winkler [1988]), that risk attitudes will affect the incentive to report one’s
subjective probability “truthfully” in the QSR.3 A sufficiently risk averse agent is clearly going to be
drawn to a report of ½, and varying degrees of risk aversion will cause varying distortions in reports
from subjective probabilities. If we knew the form of the (well-behaved) utility function of the
subjects, and their degree of risk aversion, we could infer back from any report what subjective
probability they must have had. Indeed, this is exactly what we do in the sequel, recognizing that we
only ever have estimates of their degree of risk aversion.
The LSR is also defined in terms of two positive parameters, ( and 8, that serve as fixed
rewards and penalties, respectively. The subject is paid a fixed reward less some multiple of the
absolute difference between their report and what actually happened, which is also what an
omniscient seer would have reported. Thus the payment is S(2|A occurs) = ( - 8(1-2) if event A
occurs and S(2|B occurs) = ( - 8(2-0) if B occurs. We again set ( = 8 = $100, generating payoffs
of $100 or $0 for a report of 1; $75 and $25 for a report of ¾; and $50 no matter what the outcome
for a report of ½. The LSR is not a favorite of decision theorists, since a risk neutral subject would
jump to corner-solution reports of 1 or 0 whenever their true beliefs were either side of ½. But
when the subject is (even modestly) risk averse, an interior solution is obtained, and we face the
4 Hanson [1996; p. 1224] provides a useful reminder that discrete implementations of proper scoring
rules can also engender piecewise linear opportunity sets. He points out that certain regions of the QSR
implemented by McKelvey and Page [1990] were actually LSR, and that risk-neutral subjects would then
rationally report a probability at the extremes of that linear region, and not at the discrete alternative closest to
their true belief.
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same issues of inference as with the QSR. The LSR is a favorite of experimental economists because
of the simplicity of explaining the rule: the score for a report and an event is linear in the reported
probability report, so there is no need for elaborate tables showing cryptic payoff scores for discrete
reports.4
2.  Experimental Design
We recruited 140 subjects from the student population of the University of Central Florida
in late October 2008 to participate in these experiments. Complete instructions are provided in
appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates the lottery choice that subjects were given. Each subject faced 45 such
choices, where prizes spanned the domain $0 up to $100. One choice was selected to be paid out at
random after all choices had been entered. Choices of indifference were resolved by rolling a die and
picking one lottery, as had been explained to subject. This interface builds on the classic design of
Hey and Orme [1994], and is discussed in greater detail in Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix
B]. The lotteries were presented sequentially in 3 blocks of 15, where each block had prizes in one of
three intervals between $0 and some higher level. One level was between $0 and $1, the other level
was between $0 and $10, and the third level was between $0 and $100. We presented the lotteries
sequentially so that the subject could see that all of the lotteries in one block were for a given scale.
The sequence of blocks was randomized across subjects.
Figure 2 shows the interface for the QSR as it was presented to subjects on a computer
screen and in printed instructions. The interface was explained with these instructions:
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You place your bets by sliding the bar at the bottom of the screen until you are
happy with your choice of a probability report. The computer will start at some point
on this bar at random: in the above screen it started at 71%, but you are free to
change this as much as you like. In fact, you should slide this bar and see the effects
on earnings, until you are happy to confirm your choice.
In this hypothetical example the maximum payoff you can earn is $1,000. In the
actual tasks the maximum payoff will be lower than that, and we will tell you what it
is when we come to those tasks. But the layout of the screen will be the same.
In this demonstration, the event you are betting on is whether a Ping Pong ball
drawn from a bingo cage will be Orange or White. We have a bingo cage here, and
we have 20 ping-pong balls. 15 of the balls are white, and 5 of the balls are orange.
We will give the cage a few turns to scramble them up, and then select one ball at
random.
What we want you to do is place a bet on which color will be picked. At the top of
your screen we tell you what the event is: in this case, it is Picking a Ping-Pong
Ball, and you need to bet on whether you think it will be Orange or White.
Your possible earnings are displayed in the two bars in the main part of the
screen, and also in numbers at the bottom of each bar. For example, if you
choose to report 71% you can see that you would earn $915.90 if the Ping Pong Ball
was ORANGE, and $495.90 if the Ping Pong Ball was WHITE.
The subject was then taken through displays of their payoffs if they chose to report 0% or 100%.
We then concluded the main instructions in this manner:
Summarizing, then, there are two important points for you to keep in mind when
placing your bets:
1. Your belief about the chances of each outcome is a personal judgment
that depends on information you have about the different events. In
this practice example, the information you have consists of the total number
of Orange balls and White balls.
2. Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to
gamble.  There is no right choice for everyone. For example, in a horse race
you might want to bet on the longshot since it will bring you more money if
it wins. On the other hand, you might want to bet on the favorite since it is
more likely to win something.  
For each task, your choice will depend on two things: your judgment about how
likely it is that each outcome will occur, and how much you like to gamble or take
risks.
5 These events compare to similar events employed in popular prediction markets, inspired by
Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ for the current version
of this market, and the contracts traded in the 2008 Presidential Election.
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Each subject then participated in a training choice, in which they were told the number of orange
balls in the a bingo cage that was on public display, and asked to make a report and confirm it. We
deliberately adopted an extremely high scale of a maximum $1000 payoff to ensure that the subjects
understood that this was to be a trainer.
Each subject then participated in 7 belief elicitation tasks, knowing that one would be
selected for payment. The first 3 were repetitions of the training task with orange and white ping
pong balls: subjects were told that there were 60 balls in all in a publicly visible, but initially covered, 
bingo cage, but were not told the number of orange or white balls. The urn was uncovered and spun
for 10 rotations, and then the subject had to make a report that a ball drawn at random would be
orange. We do not consider these events here. The fourth task was based on the outcomes of a test
in psychology for empathy known as The Eyes Test (e.g., Baron-Cohen [2003]). All subjects had
completed this test at the outset of the session, and the event they were asked about was whether the
score that a randomly chosen man got on the Eyes Test was equal to or greater than the score that a
randomly chosen woman would get. The final three tasks were based on the 2008 U.S. Presidential
Election, which was to be held about one week after the session. One task was whether the outright
winner of the Presidency would be a Democrat or a Republican, one task was whether the winning
share of the popular vote would be at 5 percentage points or more greater than the losing share, and
the final task was whether the winning share of the popular vote would be at 10 percentage points or
more greater than the losing share.5 Our own a priori expectations for these subjective probabilities
were just below 50%, around 80%, around 65% and less than 10%, respectively.
The exact phrasing of these events was explained in written instructions, which were also
-9-
read out loud. The event based on the Eyes Test was explained as follows: 
The Eyes Test
At the beginning of today’s experimental session we asked you to answer 36
questions, called The Eyes Test. These questions were designed by psychologists to
measure a person’s ability to “read someone else’s mind” by just looking at their
eyes.
Each and everyone of you were given the same 36 Eyes Test questions in today’s
experiment and a total score was recorded for each and every one of you in this
experiment.
Now we come to the outcome we want you to place bets on in this portion of the
experiment. We will pick one man and one woman in the room. Do you think the
man who is selected will have a higher score on the Eyes Test than the woman who
is selected? 
After everyone in the experiment has made their bets for this event we will randomly
select one man, and randomly select one woman from this experimental session. We
will use the cards we collected, and sort then into one pile for men and one pile for
women. Each pile will be shuffled, and one card drawn from each pile. We will then
compare the score for the man that is drawn with the score for the woman that is
drawn, and write these scores up on the board for you to see.
We therefore pose the following outcome for you to bet on now:
That the man we select at random will have a higher score
on the Eyes Test than the woman we select at random.
Do you have any questions?
After subjects had completed their bets on the bingo cage and Eyes Test tasks, the final three events
were explained as follows:
2008 Presidential Elections
We want you to place bets on some questions about the U.S. Presidential Elections
being held in a few weeks:
1. Will the next President of the United States be a Democrat or a Republican?
2. Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 5 or more percentage
points greater than the popular vote for the losing candidate?
3. Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 10 or more percentage
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points greater than the popular vote for the losing candidate?
It is important that you understand that the first question is about the outcome of
the Electoral College vote, and not the popular vote. The popular vote is just the
sum of all votes across the United States. We are only referring to the Presidential
Election, and not to any other elections that might occur on the same day.
For the second and third question, we are asking if you think that the winner of the
popular vote will beat the loser by 5 or 10 percentage points or more. For example, if
the winner of the popular vote gets 51% of the vote and the loser gets 49%, then this
is a 2 percentage point difference. If the winner gets 53% and the loser gets 47%,
then this is a 6 percentage point difference.
The election will be on Tuesday, November 4, 2008. To use a widely respected
public source for the outcome, we will use the New York Times of Friday,
November 7, 2008 as the official source used to determine your payoffs. In the event
that there is a drawn out determination of the next President, such as in the 2000
election, we will delay payments until Inauguration Day, which is on January 20,
2009. 
You will be paid for your bets in checks that will be mailed out on Monday,
November 10, assuming we know who the next President will be at that time.
Please go ahead now and place your bets for this event, unless you have any
questions.
The subjects then completed their belief elicitation tasks for these Presidential election events, and
went on to the lottery choice tasks described earlier.
The experiments were conducted in the week of Monday October 27 through Friday
October 31, in the week prior to the 2008 election. Including other belief elicitation treatments, a
total of 354 subjects participated, earning a total of $32,101 for an average of just over $90 per
subject. Each session lasted around 2 hours. There was considerable variation in earnings, with one
subject taking home $3 and another subject taking home $205.
3. Econometric Model
We develop the econometric model to be estimated in three stages. First we present the
specification of risk attitudes assuming an EUT model of latent choice, where the focus is entirely
6 We could just develop an RDU model and test if the estimated probability weighting is the identity
function, in which case the RDU model collapses to an EUT model. However, the exposition is, in our view,
simpler if one develops the models separately.
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on the concavity of the estimated utility function. Second, we present the specification of risk
attitudes assuming a RDU model of latent choice, so that risk attitudes are determined by the
interplay of concave utility functions and non-linear probability weighting.6 Third, we consider the
joint estimation of risk attitudes and subjective probability, using either the EUT or the RDU
specification.
A. Risk Attitudes under Expected Utility Theory
We assume an Expo-Power (EP) utility function originally proposed by Saha [1993].
Following Holt and Laury [2002], the EP function is defined as
U(y) = [1-exp(-"y1-r)]/", (1)
where " and r are parameters to be estimated, and y is income from the experimental choice. The
EP function can exhibit increasing or decreasing relative risk aversion (RRA), depending on the
parameter ": RRA is defined by r + "(1-r)y1-r, so RRA varies with income if " … 0 and the estimate
of r defines RRA at a zero income. This function nests CRRA (as " 6 0) and CARA (as r  6 0).
The utility function (1) can be estimated using maximum likelihood and a latent EUT
structural model of choice. Let there be K possible outcomes in a lottery; in our lottery choice task
K#4. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome k in the lottery choice task, pk, are those that
are induced by the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each
outcome in each lottery i:
EUi = 3k=1,K [ pk × uk ]. (2)
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r and ", and the index
7 It is well known, but useful to note, that (3) is equivalent to 7(EUR - EUL) where 7(@) is the logistic
cumulative density function. Thus (3) embodies a statistical “link function” between the difference in the EU
of the two lotteries and the probability of the observed choice.
8 In our lottery experiments the subjects are told at the outset that any expression of indifference
would mean that the experimenter would toss a fair coin to make the decision for them if that choice was
selected to be played out. Hence one can modify the likelihood to take these responses into account either by
recognizing this is a third option, the compound lottery of the two lotteries, or alternatively that such choices
implies a 50:50 mixture of the likelihood of choosing either lottery, as illustrated by Harrison and Rutström
[2008; p.71]. We do not consider indifference here because it was an extremely rare event.
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LEU = euR/(euL + euR) (3)
calculated, where
eui = exp(EUi), (4)
for i= {R, L}, and where EUL is the “left” lottery and EUR is the “right” lottery, as displayed to the
subject and illustrated in Figure 1. This latent index, based on latent preferences, is already in the
form of a probability.7
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and EP
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r and " given the above statistical specification
and the observed choices. If we ignore responses that reflect indifference8 the log-likelihood is then
ln L(r, "; y, X)  = 3i [ (ln LEU×I(yi = 1)) + (ln (1-LEU)×I(yi = !1)) ] (5)
where I(@) is the indicator function, yi =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option R (L) lottery in risk
aversion task i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics reflecting age, sex, race, and so on.
When we pool responses over subjects the X vector will play an important role to allow for some
heterogeneity of preferences.
To allow for subject heterogeneity with respect to risk attitudes, the parameters r and " are
each modeled as linear functions of observed individual characteristics of the subject. For example,
assume that we only had information on the age and sex of the subject, denoted Age (years of age)
and Female (0 for males, and 1 for females). Then we would estimate the coefficients r0, r1 and r2  in
9 This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index LEU and the
probability of picking one or other lottery; in the case of the normal CDF, this link function is M(LEU). If the
subject exhibited no errors from the perspective of EUT, this function would be a step function: zero for all
values of LEU<0, anywhere between 0 and 1 for LEU=0, and 1 for all values of LEU>0. Harrison [2008;
p.326] illustrates the implied CDF, referring to it as the CDF of a “Hardnose Theorist.”
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r = r0 + r1×Age +  r2× Female. Therefore, each subject would have a different estimated r, r$, for a
given set of estimates of r0, r1 and r2 to the extent that the subject had distinct individual
characteristics. So if there were two subjects with the same sex and age, to use the above example,
they would literally have the same r$, but if they differed in sex and/or age they would generally have
distinct r$. In fact, we choose to use 4 individual characteristics to model heterogeneity in our
estimated risk preferences. Apart from a dummy for peopled aged over 22 years and gender, these
include binary indicators for subjects that self-declare as having a high GPA (over 3.75) and self-
declare as graduate students. 
An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some errors. The
notion of error is one that has already been encountered in the form of the statistical assumption (4)
that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the EU of that lottery exceeds the EU of the
other lottery.9 By varying the shape of the link function implicit in (4), one can informally imagine
subjects that are more sensitive to a given difference in the index LEU and subjects that are not so
sensitive. We use the contextual error specification proposed by Wilcox [2009]. It posits the latent
index
eui = exp[(EUi/<)/:], (4N)
instead of (4), where < is a normalizing term for each lottery pair L and R, and :>0 is a structural
“noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the perspective of the deterministic EUT model.
The normalizing term < is defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus
the minimum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair, and ensures that the normalized EU difference
10 The normalizing term < is given by the value of r and the lottery parameters, which are part of X.
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[(EUR - EUL)/<] remains in the unit interval. As : 6 4 this specification collapses LEU to 0 for any
values of EUR and EUL, so the probability of either choice converges to ½. So a larger : means that
the difference in the EU of the two lotteries, conditional on the estimate of r, has less predictive
effect on choices. Thus : can be viewed as a parameter that flattens out, or “sharpens,” the link
functions implicit in (4). This is just one of several different types of error story that could be used,
and Wilcox [2008] provides a masterful review of the implications of the strengths and weaknesses
of the major alternatives.
Thus we extend the likelihood specification to include the noise parameter : and maximize
ln L(r, ", :; y, X) by estimating r, " and :, given observations on y and X.10 Additional details of the
estimation methods used, including corrections for “clustered” errors when we pool choices over
subjects and tasks, is provided by Harrison and Rutström [2008; p.69ff].
B. Risk Attitudes under Rank Dependent Utility Theory
The RDU model extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights on lottery
outcomes. Instead of (1) we have
U(y) = [1-exp(-Vy1-Ë)]/V, (6)
where Ë and V are the coefficient for the curvature of the utility function, comparable to r and " in
(1). To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility defined by (2) with RDU
RDUi = 3k=1, K [ wk × uk ] (7)
where
wi = T(pi + ... + pn) - T(pi+1 + ... + pn) (8)
for i=1,... , n-1, and
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wi = T(pi) (9)
for i=n, the subscript indicating outcomes ranked from worst to best, and where T(p) is some
probability weighting function. We adopt the simple “power” probability weighting function
proposed by Quiggin [1982], with curvature parameter (:
T(p) = p( (10)
So (…1 is consistent with a deviation from the conventional EUT representation. 
The same behavioral noise specification is used as in the EUT model, replacing EUi with
RDUi, leading to the definition of a comparable latent index LRDU. The likelihood specification for
the RDU model is therefore 
ln L(Ë, V, (, :; y, X)  = 3i [(ln M(LRDU)×I(yi=1))+(ln (1!M(LRDU))×I(yi= !1)) ] (11)
and entails the estimate of Ë, V, ( and : using maximum likelihood. Individual heterogeneity is
allowed for by estimating the parameters Ë, V and ( as linear functions of the demographic
characteristics defined earlier.
Figure 3 shows the manner in which the parameter ( characterizes the probability weighting
function and the decisions weights used to evaluate lottery choices. Since we assume (=0.77<1 in
this illustration, to anticipate our estimates, the probability weighting function T(p) is concave. For
simplicity here we assume lotteries with 2, 3 or 4 prizes that are equally likely when we generate the
decision weights. So for the case of 2 prizes, each prize has p=½; with 3 prizes, each prize has p=a;
and with 4 prizes, each prize has p=¼. For the 3-prize and 4-prize lottery we see the standard result,
that the decision weights on the largest prizes are relatively greater than the true probability, and the
decision weights on the smallest prizes are relatively smaller than the true probability. In the belief
elicitation task there were only 2 prizes per lottery, so this value of the parameter ( puts greater
decision weight on the higher prize.
Each panel in Figure 3 is important for our analysis. For the purposes of estimating ( from
11 The expression “risk neutral” here should be understood to include the curvature of the utility
function and the curvature of the probability weighting function. So it is not just a statement about the
former, unless one assumes EUT.
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the observed lottery choices we only need the decision weights in the right panel of Figure 3. But for
the purposes of recovering subjective beliefs subject to probability weighting, we only need the
probability weighting function. In fact, we need it’s inverse function, since it is the B in the T(B)
function that we are seeking to recover in that case. We do not directly observe T(p) or T(B), but we
can estimate T(@) as part of the latent structure generating the observed choices in the two types of
task, implicitly assuming that T(p) = T(B). Once we have T(@) we can then recover B by directly
applying the estimated probability weighting function, such as the one shown, for a typical (, in the
left panel of Figure 3.
C. Estimating the Subjective Probability
The responses to the belief elicitation task can be used to estimate the subjective probability
that each subject holds if we are willing to assume something about how they make decisions under
risk.
If they are assumed to be risk neutral, then we can directly infer the subjective probability
from the report of the subject.11 This result is immediate under the QSR, but raises a problem of
interpretation under the LSR if the reports are not at the corner solutions of 0% and 100%. In that
case the behavioral error story has a lot of explaining to do, if one wants to be formal. On the other
hand, any minimal level of risk aversion will suffice, under the LSR, to generate interior responses,
so we assume that the subjects indeed have some minimal level of risk aversion when we report
“risk neutral subjective beliefs” for the LSR.
Moving to the models that allow for varying risk attitudes, we jointly estimate the subjective
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probability and the parameters of the core model. Assume for the moment that we have an EUT
specification. The subject that selects report 2 from a given scoring rule receives the following EU
EU2 =      BA  × U(payout if A occurs | report 2) +
         (1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | report 2) (12)
where BA is the subjective probability that A will occur. The payouts that enter the utility function
are defined by the scoring rule and of course the specific report 2, and span the interval [$0, $100].
For the QSR and a report of 75%, for example, we have
EU75% = BA × U($93.75) + (1-BA) × U($43.75) (12N)
For the LSR, and the same report, we have:
EU75% = BA × U($75) + (1-BA) × U($25) (12O)
and so on for other possible reports. We observe the report made by the subject, and we know that
they had 101 possible reports defined over percentage points, so we can calculate the likelihood of
that choice given values of r, BA and :. In this case the likelihood is the multinomial analogue of the
binary logit specification used for lottery choices. We define
eu1 = exp[(EU1/<)/:] (13)
for any report 1, analogously to (4N), and then
LEU = eu2/(eu0% + eu1% + ÿ + eu100%) (14)
for the specific report 2 observed, analogously to (3).
We need r and " to evaluate the utility function in (12), we need BA to calculate the EU2 in
(12) for each possible report 1 in {0%, 1%, 2%, ÿ, 100% }once we know the utility values, and we
need : to calculate the latent indices (13) and (14) that generate the subjective probability of
observing the choice of specific report 2 when we allow for some noise in that process. The joint
maximum likelihood problem is to find the values of these parameters that best explain observed
choices in the belief elicitation tasks as well as observed choices in the lottery tasks.
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Exactly the same logic extends to the model in which we assume an RDU latent structure
instead of an EUT latent structure. In effect, the lottery task allow us to identify r and " under EUT,
and Ë, V and ( under RDU, since BA plays no direct role in explaining the choices in that task.
Individual heterogeneity is allowed for by estimating the B parameter as a linear functions of the
demographic characteristics defined earlier, as well as allowing risk attitudes to vary with
demographic characteristics.
4. Results
A. Raw Elicited Beliefs
Figure 4 displays the raw responses from each of the scoring rules for each event, in the
form of kernel densities, and Table 1 shows summary statistics of the elicited responses. The
summary statistics suggest that the QSR and LSR provided roughly the same responses, but the
densities in Figure 3 do have some differences in shape. In part this simply alerts us to be aware of
the non-Gaussian shape of these distributions.
The general location of the densities corresponds with our qualitative priors
 on the subjective beliefs that were to be expected for these events. For the Eyes Test it appears,
from the observation that the modal response is around 0.4 (LSR) to 0.4 (QSR), that the sample did
not expect the male score to exceed the female score, but that this was not an overwhelmingly
strong belief.  The sample appeared confident that Barack Obama would indeed win the election
outright, but displayed a healthy sense of perspective on what the winning margin would be. For our
purposes, the choices of a 5% and 10% threshold for the popular vote could not have worked out
better, with a majority believing that a 5% margin would be attained but that a 10% margin would
not. These results show, at a minimum, that responses were at least correlated with what we believe
to be reasonably coherent subjective beliefs for these events.
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The fact that the responses to the LSR are not at “corner” value of 0 or 1 shows that the
subjects were not exactly risk neutral. But it does not show much more, because one would observe
some interior response even for small amounts of risk aversion, as noted earlier.
With the exception of the bets on the outright winner of the Presidential election, the
distribution of responses for the two scoring rules are roughly the same. This conclusion is
supported by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two distributions are equal.
In the case of the outright winner event, the p-value on this test is only 0.011, so we can reject that
hypothesis in this instance. This finding provides some support for those that would prefer to use
the LSR on the grounds that it is simpler to explain to subjects than the QSR. Of course, the real
issue is whether they generate the same estimates of subjective probability when one allows for risk
attitudes.
B. Characterizing Risk Attitudes
Looking just at the lottery choices under a maintained hypothesis of EUT for now, we find
evidence of modest risk aversion at low stakes (since r>0, and r defines RRA at y=0), and evidence
of increasing relative risk aversion as the prizes climb to $100 (since ">0). Detailed results are
provided in Appendix C, since they are only of indirect interest here. Given these parameter
estimates we can calculate RRA at various prize levels: at $25, $50, $75 and $100 the RRA is
estimated to be 0.49, 0.61, 0.71 and 0.81, respectively. Thus subjects exhibit much stronger risk
aversion for the higher stakes in the belief task than they do for the lower stakes.
When we allow for an array of covariates to better characterize the heterogeneity of risk
attitudes, we observe females to be significantly more risk averse, with rra .14 higher at the $0 level.
Detailed estimates are provided in a Appendix C. The net effect of allowing for covariates is to
slightly increase the range of RRA values for different prize levels: they span 0.29 at $0 up to 0.82 at
12 Using extremely low stakes for the QSR has the possible advantage that one might appeal to risk
neutrality on a priori grounds, but the corollary is that one faces the risk of payoff dominance problems. When
we say “extremely low,” we mean it: many experimenters use a maximum payoff of 10 cents, or perhaps $1
on a generous day in the lab. We understand well the arguments advanced for low payoffs, and review them
in an appendix, but they remain extremely low by any practical metric.
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$100, with wider standard errors than when there were no covariates.
These results also suggest that one might see quite different effects of “risk-conditioning”
the reports for scoring rules depending on the stakes involved. Our stakes are huge in relation to the
literature, reviewed in detail in an Appendix: a maximum prize of $100, compared to common
implementations in experiments of a maximum prize of less than $1. To be fair, those low-stake
implementations are often in the context of the probability elicitation task being paired with another
task, such as the choice of a strategy in a game, and the stake for the probability elicitation task is
kept small to avoid the subject attempting to construct a portfolio of paired responses across the
two tasks. Whatever the position one takes on the behavioral significance of the “payoff
dominance” problems that arise from low payoffs, our results on risk attitudes for low stakes and
high stakes imply that the extent of adjustment for risk attitudes is much greater for higher stake
elicitations. It is a factor for both, since we estimate RRA to be positive for the lowest stakes, but it
is not as serious a factor as when the stakes are higher. Thus one might expect to see much more
variability of responses for lower-stake scoring rule behavior than for higher-stake scoring rule
behavior, ceteris paribus the subjective probability.12
The results from estimating the RDU model are slightly different. Detailed estimates are
again reported in Appendix C. The estimates of the utility function parameters Ë and V are both
smaller than their counterparts (r and ") under EUT, implying lower levels of risk aversion. We
estimate the probability weighting parameter (=0.72 without covariates, and can reject the
hypothesis that this is equal to 1 (p-value<0.001). A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the
13 The alternative approach is to assume a finite mixture specification and evaluate the fraction of the
choices consistent with EUT and the fraction consistent with RDU (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2009]). For
our purposes such a refined characterization of risk attitudes is not needed.
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EUT model and the RDU model are the same when there are no covariates has a P21 = 35.47 (p-
value<0.01), so we reject that null. The same conclusion is true when we account for covariates and
heterogeneity of responses. There are no strikingly different demographic characteristics, and the
small changes across the board does not add up to a statistically significant difference. A likelihood
ratio test of the hypothesis that the EUT model and the RDU model are the same when covariates
are allowed has a P214 = 47.74 (p-value<0.01). The RDU model thus econometrically outperforms
the EUT model when one assumes that the data is completely generated by one or the other.13
One noteworthy feature of these estimates is that one can reject the CRRA specification for
both EUT and RDU models. Of course, one might accept CRRA if estimating risk attitudes over a
much smaller income domain, such as between $0 and $10.
C. Estimating Subjective Probabilities
Table 2 lists the main results from estimating subjective probabilities for each of the four
events considered here, and assuming either an EUT or RDU specification. Table 3 provides
detailed estimates for one event from the model assuming EUT and using covariates for each
parameter to capture observable individual heterogeneity. Figure 5 displays kernel density functions
of the estimated subjective probability distributions from estimates such as those in Table 3, for two
events, and assuming EUT. It also shows the empirical cumulative density functions from the
estimated subjective probability distributions. Figure 6 does the same as Figure 5, but using the
RDU model instead of the EUT model.
 Given that we find evidence of risk aversion in our subjects over the domain of prizes on
14 In part this may be due to the use of pooled predictions of the estimated subjective probability to
generate this distribution instead of subject-specific responses.
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offer in their belief elicitation tasks, our estimated subjective probabilities are all translations of the
raw responses away from the 50% response. The reason, again, is that risk averse subjects are drawn
to respond toward 50% simply to reduce the uncertainty over payoffs, so evidence of risk aversion
implies that their true, latent, subjective probabilities must be further away from 50% than their raw
responses. Our maximum likelihood estimates simply impose some parametric structure on that
qualitative logic, to be able to quantify the extent of the required translation and the precision of the
resulting inference about the latent subjective probability. And for the RDU model, our approach
allows the probability weighting function to directly affect the estimated subjective probabilities,
quite apart from the effect it has on the decision weights for the QSR and LSR bets.
For the Eyes Test, we observe a small movement in subjective probabilities away from the
raw responses under EUT, but this in large part follows from the fact that the raw responses
themselves were already so close to 50%. The effect of probability weighting is significant, again in
large measure due to the baseline values of the raw responses being close to 50%. The estimated
value of the probability weighting parameter in this case is (=0.72, which is the value used to
generate Figure 3. By inspection of the left panel of Figure 3 we observe that probability values of
just less than 50% would appear to be the most significantly affected by this functional form,
explaining why the RDU model generates different estimates than the EUT model.
Figure 5 indicates that the distribution of estimated subjective probabilities is much more
concentrated than the raw responses.14 Our estimates indicate that one might arrive at roughly the
same mean estimate of the subjective probability without adjusting for risk attitudes, but the
precision might be very different after one correctly adjusts for risk.
For the three election events, we see more interesting effects of adjusting for risk aversion.
15 The estimates for the subjective probability B refer to a non-linear transform in which we actually
estimate the parameter 6 and then convert 6 to B using B = 1/(1+exp(6)). Thus 6 can vary between ±4 and
B is constrained to the open unit interval. To interpret these coefficients, 6=0 implies B=½, 6>0 implies
B<½, and 6<0 implies B>½. The estimates subjective probabilities in Figures 5 and 6 have been converted
back using this non-linear function and the “delta method” to correctly calculate standard errors (Oehlert
[1992]).
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In the “win by 5%” event, which is perhaps the most interesting one, we observe a marked
translation from the raw response average of 59% to 73% under EUT, and from 50% to 73% under
RDU. The 95% confidence interval on each of these estimate does include 59%. In the case of the
outright winner event we estimate latent subjective probabilities close to 1, rather than the raw
response average of 71%; similarly, in the case of the chance of the popular vote for the winner
being more than 10% of the popular vote of the loser, we estimate subjective probabilities close to
0, rather than the raw response average of 28%. Interpreted literally as reflecting the beliefs of a
single agent, these results are a puzzle: if the agent has (essentially) certain subjective beliefs about
the outcome, then why would risk aversion affect them? As we see, however, these estimates mask
some heterogeneity across a subset of the subjects in the underlying distribution of beliefs.
Table 3 lists the detailed EUT estimates for the model of the “win by 5%” event when we
include covariates.15 These estimates generated the results shown in Figure 5, which displays the
distribution of estimated subjective probabilities for this sample, where the distribution here is
across point estimates of the subjective probability for each subject. We observe a clear shift in the
distribution from correcting for risk attitudes. In both Figures 5 and 6,  the “win by 5% or more”
risk-adjusted estimates are larger than the raw responses in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance, and not merely on average. And both models, EUT and RDU, shift the estimates
subjective probability in the same direction here. But on the Eyes Test, the EUT and RDU models
of risk attitude leads to markedly different inferences. Raw responses indicate that about 15% of the
sample have a subjective belief on this event being less than 0.3. However, conditional on EUT, the
16  For example, females are 38% of the sample and have a significantly lower belief that this outcome
will occur.
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chances of a subjective belief less than 0.3 are virtually zero after adjusting for risk, whereas,
conditional on RDU, inferred chances of a subjective belief below 0.3 are in the range of 30% to
40%. This illustrates our motivating hypothesis that inferences about subjective belief could be
sensitive to the specific model of risk attitudes specified, quite apart from them being sensitive to the
correct for risk attitudes in general.
There is no major effect of allowing for observable individual heterogeneity on the point
estimates for the beliefs about the Eyes test, but there is some effect for the election events. For the
“win by 5%” event the average belief estimate changes from 73% to 66%, but there is no statistically
significant difference between the two.
For the “win by 10%” and outright winner events, allowing for heterogeneity does shift the
average belief so that it is not 0 or 1. The “win by 10%” average belief is estimated to be 0.060 when
we allow for heterogeneous beliefs, with the Business majors having a significantly higher belief that
this outcome will occur. These majors are 60% of the sample, and while this marginal effect is offset
by other marginal effects16, it accounts for the overall average being greater than zero. Similarly, for
the outright winner event, the average belief is 0.870 when we allow for heterogeneous beliefs, with
females having a 32.2 percentage point lower belief that this event will occur (p-value of 0.14 on this
estimated marginal effect). Figure 7 illustrates the calibration involved, with the top two panels
reflecting the use of an EUT model. Overall, women have average beliefs of 0.726 and men have
average beliefs of 0.968; the density of beliefs for women are shown in the bottom left panel of
Figure 7. Similarly, students that are not in their Senior year have much lower subjective probabilities
than others, as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 7. Thus there are significant sub-samples
for these two events for which beliefs are not degenerate at 0 or 1, and for which risk aversion plays
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a role in affecting inferences about true, latent, subjective beliefs.
We observe no statistically significant effect from using the QSR or LSR, but there is no
reason to expect one after we condition for risk attitudes. That is, the two scoring rules simply
provide subjects with different lotteries with which to place bets about their subjective beliefs. So
the same subjective belief should be estimated from each treatment, once one has conditioned on
risk attitudes. Comparable estimation using the RDU model generate the results in Figure 6. Again,
this provides support for those that would use the LSR over the QSR on the grounds that it is easier
to explain to subjects.
To put these results into perspective, particularly those for the outright winner, it is
important to note that in the week of the experiments the tide of public opinion clearly favored
Barack Obama to win in a landslide. Eliciting a raw belief of only a 70% chance of Obama winning
is therefore puzzling, and an a priori challenge for those that would use the raw results from a QSR
or LSR procedure. For example, consider the Iowa Presidential Market, the current version of the
prediction market developed by Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. Figure 8 displays
average daily prices on this market for the month of October 2008, and marks off the week in which
our experiments were conducted. Average prices for the week of our experiments implied that the
probability of Obama winning was around 85%. Moreover, as the average prices for this “winner
take all” contract over the whole month show, this was the prevailing sense of the market for at least
2 weeks prior to our experiments. Indeed, the online Irish betting house, PaddyPower.com, was
already paying out on over 1 million in pro-Obama bets as early as October 17!
Figure 8 also shows that the Iowa Presidential Market on the popular vote share suggested
that a 10% difference was possible. On the other hand, one striking feature of these two contracts
(the “winner take all” and the “popular vote share”) is that the latter was poorly traded in
comparison to the former, as measured by volume. Of course, that could reflect a market that has
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found an equilibrium price, but it also could reflect a market in which there is too much uncertainty
about the outcome for traders to feel safe making a bet.
6. Conclusions
We demonstrate how one can make the theory of subjective probability elicitation practical.
Our experimental interface allows subjects to see the tradeoff between alternative reports and payoff
consequences, without the need for long lists of payoff tables to be printed out. Our experimental
design shows how one can pair different types of choice tasks to allow estimation of risk attitudes,
which can then be used to condition the inferences from responses to the scoring rule tasks. Finally,
our structural econometric model shows how maximum likelihood methods can then be used to
estimate subjective probabilities. We applied this approach to elicit subjective probabilities over four
naturally occurring events from a sample of 140 subjects.
Our results show that one has to be sensitive to the risk attitudes of subjects before drawing
inferences about subjective probabilities from responses to scoring rules. More accurately, we show
that one cannot just directly treat the responses to the scoring rule as if it is a subjective probability,
unless one is willing a priori to make striking assumptions about risk attitudes. Those assumptions are
rejected in our data.
Quite apart from inferring the correct point estimate of subjective probability, uncertainty
about risk attitudes affects the confidence that one should have in any point estimate. Even if
subjects are “approximately risk neutral” on average, and the QSR is used, uncertainty about the
precise level of risk attitudes should be properly reflected in uncertainty about inferences over
subjective probabilities. Our analysis has demonstrated how to combine theory and econometrics to
do just that. The choice task for eliciting subjective probabilities generates a point response that
might appear to be quite precise by itself, but which is actually not a very precise estimate of the
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latent subjective probability when one properly accounts for uncertainty over risk attitudes.
Of course, although the estimation of subjective probabilities is an important objective in
itself, the issue of how to best characterize subjective uncertainty, and attitudes towards it, involve
deeper issues. Our estimation approach is clearly within the conventional Bayesian subjective
probability framework of Savage [1971][1972]. That framework provides one point of departure for
criticisms of conventional EUT that are motivated by an attempt to provide an explanation for the
idea that subjective uncertainty should be characterized in a way that allows for the possibility that
subjective beliefs are not “boiled down” to subjective probabilities. Exactly how one then models
subjective beliefs is an open and important area of research (e.g., Smith [1969], Gilboa and
Schmeidler [1989], Ghirardoto, Maccheroni and Marinacci [2004], Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
[2005], Nau [2007] and Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler [2008]). It seems plausible that subjects
exhibit some degree of “uncertainty aversion” in addition to traditional risk aversion when faced
with making decisions about events that involve subjective probabilities rather than objective
probabilities.
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Figure 1: Illustrative Lottery Choice
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Figure 2: Illustrative Quadratic Scoring Rule Interface
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Scoring Rule Responses
Event Scoring Rule Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Eyes Test Quadratic 0.43 0.40 0.19
Linear 0.43 0.40 0.19
Both 0.43 0.40 0.19
President Quadratic 0.69 0.70 0.20
Linear 0.74 0.75 0.22
Both 0.71 0.70 0.21
Win by 5% Quadratic 0.59 0.60 0.23
Linear 0.58 0.60 0.26
Both 0.59 0.60 0.24
Win by 10% Quadratic 0.28 0.30 0.20
Linear 0.29 0.26 0.21
Both 0.28 0.30 0.21
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Figure 4: Elicited Responses from QSR and LSR
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Table 2: Estimated Subjective Probabilities
Event
Specification
(Log-Likelihood)
Point
Estimate Standard Error
95% Confidence
Interval
Eyes Test EUT (-4562.7) 0.41 0.023 0.37/0.46
RDU (-4549.6) 0.30 0.037 0.23/0.38
Raw Responses 0.43 0.19 0/0.95
President EUT (-4547.0) 0.99 0.0004 0.99/1.00
RDU (-4530.5) 0.99 0.0001 0.99/1.00
Raw Responses 0.71 0.21 0.20/1
Win by 5% EUT (-4579.3) 0.73 0.10 0.54/0.92
RDU (-4562.8) 0.82 0.27 0.29/1.00
Raw Responses 0.59 0.24 0.10/1
Win by 10% EUT (-4546.5) .0002 0.00018 0/0.0006
RDU (-4528.8) .0002 ‡ ‡
Raw Responses 0.28 0.20 0/0.77
Notes: ‡ Due to numerical unreliability of the subjective probability at extreme “corner” values, the
standard errors and confidence intervals could not be reliably estimated.
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Table 3: Detailed EUT Estimates for Bets on Win Margin Being 5% or More
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
r
Constant 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.35
female Female 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.28
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.09 0.10 0.36 -0.11 0.30
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.05 0.09 0.59 -0.13 0.23
Graduate Graduate Student -0.17 0.12 0.17 -0.40 0.07
"
Constant 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
female Female 0.02 0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.05
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.01 0.01 0.41 -0.02 0.04
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.00 0.02 1.00 -0.03 0.03
Graduate Graduate Student 0.00 0.02 0.97 -0.03 0.03
:RA Fechner Error on Risk Tasks 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08
B
Constant -1.20 0.65 0.07 -2.47 0.08
female Female 0.76 0.79 0.34 -0.80 2.31
Over22 Over 22 Years of age -0.28 0.86 0.75 -1.97 1.42
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.32 0.46 0.49 -0.58 1.23
Graduate Graduate Student -0.48 1.55 0.76 -3.52 2.56
LSR Linear Scoring Rule tasks 0.23 0.83 0.79 -1.40 1.85
:BE Fechner Error on Belief Tasks 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.43
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Figure 5: Estimated Subjective Probabilities and Raw Responses
Assuming Expected Utility Model
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Figure 6: Estimated Subjective Probabilities and Raw Responses
Assuming Rank-Dependent Utility Model
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Appendix A: Instructions
We provide complete instructions for the introduction to the session (marked I in the top,
right corner of the first page of instructions, the quadratic scoring rule task trainer (marked q), the
linear scoring rule trainer (marked L), the actual belief elicitation tasks for which subjects are paid
(marked sr100), and then the lottery choice tasks (marked LOT). Copies of the exact instructions,
which were printed in color, are available on request. Each subject received either the QSR or the
LSR instructions.
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YOUR INSTRUCTIONS I
Welcome! Today we will be asking you several types of questions. Some of
these will earn you cash, which we will pay you today. And some may earn you cash
which we will pay you in a few weeks. You have already earned $5 for showing up and
agreeing to participate.
There are basically four stages today:
1. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions,
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in.
2. We will then pause, and provide some instructions on the next task, which
involves you making some judgements about what someone in a picture is
thinking. We will explain that task when we come to it.
3. We will then pause, and provide more instructions on the next task, which will
involve you placing some bets on things that have yet to happen. In this stage we
will take small breaks between the bets you place, so that we may explain the
next specific thing that you are to bet on. These choices will directly affect your
earnings. Nothing comes out of your own pocket.
4. We will then pause, and provide more instructions on some choices you are to
make over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring.
These choices will also directly affect your earnings.
The instructions for the second, third and fourth stage will provide more information on
the type of choices you are being asked to make.
The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the
money you have earned, as well as provide a receipt for any earnings that will be paid
in the future.
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, at the end to keep
your earnings private.
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so
take your time.
YOU MAY NOW PROCEED WITH THE FIRST STAGE.
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INSTRUCTIONS (CONTINUED) q
In this stage we will give you tasks where you will place bets on the outcome of
events that will happen today or in the future. For example, who will be the next U.S.
President? You can make more money the more accurately you can predict these
outcomes.
You place these bets on a screen like the one below. In a moment we will let you
practice with this screen on your computer. Remember, any betting you do today is with
our money, not your money.
You place your bets by sliding the bar at the bottom of the screen until you are
happy with your choice of a probability report. The computer will start at some point on
this bar at random: in the above screen it started at 71%, but you are free to change this
as much as you like. In fact, you should slide this bar and see the effects on earnings,
until you are happy to confirm your choice.
ENTER THE PASSWORD THAT IS BEING ANNOUNCED NOW.
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In this hypothetical example the maximum payoff you can earn is $1,000. In the
actual tasks the maximum payoff will be lower than that, and we will tell you what it is
when we come to those tasks. But the layout of the screen will be the same.
In this demonstration, the event you are betting on is whether a Ping Pong ball
drawn from a bingo cage will be Orange or White. We have a bingo cage here, and we
have 20 ping-pong balls. 15 of the balls are white, and 5 of the balls are orange. We will
give the cage a few turns to scramble them up, and then select one ball at random.
What we want you to do is place a bet on which color will be picked. At the top of
your screen we tell you what the event is: in this case, it is Picking a Ping-Pong Ball,
and you need to bet on whether you think it will be Orange or White.
Your possible earnings are displayed in the two bars in the main part of the
screen, and also in numbers at the bottom of each bar. For example, if you choose
to report 71% you can see that you would earn $915.90 if the Ping Pong Ball was
ORANGE, and $495.90 if the Ping Pong Ball was WHITE.
Lets see what happens if you make different reports. If you chose to report 0% or
100% here is what you would see, and earn:
These screens are a little small, but you can see that these two reports lead to extreme
payoffs. The “good news” is the possible $1,000 payoff, but the “bad news” is the
possible $0 payoff. In between the reports of 0% and 100% you will have some positive
payoff no matter what happens, but it will vary, as you can see from the report of 71%.
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INSTRUCTIONS (CONTINUED) L
In this stage we will give you tasks where you will place bets on the outcome of
events that will happen today or in the future. For example, who will be the next U.S.
President? You can make more money the more accurately you can predict these
outcomes.
You place these bets on a screen like the one below. In a moment we will let you
practice with this screen on your computer. Remember, any betting you do today is with
our money, not your money.
You place your bets by sliding the bar at the bottom of the screen until you are
happy with your choice of a probability report. The computer will start at some point on
this bar at random: in the above screen it started at 71%, but you are free to change this
as much as you like. In fact, you should slide this bar and see the effects on earnings,
until you are happy to confirm your choice.
ENTER THE PASSWORD THAT IS BEING ANNOUNCED NOW.
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In this hypothetical example the maximum payoff you can earn is $1,000. In the
actual tasks the maximum payoff will be lower than that, and we will tell you what it is
when we come to those tasks. But the layout of the screen will be the same.
In this demonstration, the event you are betting on is whether a Ping Pong ball
drawn from a bingo cage will be Orange or White. We have a bingo cage here, and we
have 20 ping-pong balls. 15 of the balls are white, and 5 of the balls are orange. We will
give the cage a few turns to scramble them up, and then select one ball at random.
What we want you to do is place a bet on which color will be picked. At the top of
your screen we tell you what the event is: in this case, it is Picking a Ping-Pong Ball,
and you need to bet on whether you think it will be Orange or White.
Your possible earnings are displayed in the two bars in the main part of the
screen, and also in numbers at the bottom of each bar. For example, if you choose
to report 71% you can see that you would earn $710 if the Ping Pong Ball was
ORANGE, and $290 if the Ping Pong Ball was WHITE.
Lets see what happens if you make different reports. If you chose to report 0% or
100% here is what you would see, and earn:
These screens are a little small, but you can see that these two reports lead to extreme
payoffs. The “good news” is the possible $1,000 payoff, but the “bad news” is the
possible $0 payoff. In between the reports of 0% and 100% you will have some positive
payoff no matter what happens, but it will vary, as you can see from the report of 71%.
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Summarizing, then, there are two important points for you to keep in mind when
placing your bets:
1. Your belief about the chances of each outcome is a personal judgment that
depends on information you have about the different events. In this practice
example, the information you have consists of the total number of Orange balls
and White balls.
2. Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to
gamble.  There is no right choice for everyone. For example, in a horse race you
might want to bet on the longshot since it will bring you more money if it wins. On
the other hand, you might want to bet on the favorite since it is more likely to win
something.  
For each task, your choice will depend on two things: your judgment about how likely it
is that each outcome will occur, and how much you like to gamble or take risks.   
You will now make your report in this practice round. When you have chosen the
report, confirm your bet by clicking on the OK tab.
After you click OK, a special box will come up which causes the program to
pause. We will do this after every series of bets, and then explain what the next few
bets are about. We will tell you what the password is when we are all ready to proceed.
There is plenty of time, so there is no need to rush.
When everyone has placed their bets we will pick the ball and you will see what
your earnings would have been if this had been for money. After that we will go on with
the bets for which you can earn real money.
Does anyone have any questions?
ENTER THE PASSWORD THAT IS BEING ANNOUNCED NOW.
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INSTRUCTIONS (CONTINUED) sr100
We are now ready to begin the choices for which you will be paid. There will be
several sets of choices. In each case we will describe the bet to you, and then you can
place your bets. Then we will explain the next couple of bets to you, and you place
those bets.
Some of these bets will be about outcomes we know today, here and now, and
some will be about outcomes we will only know in a few weeks. There will be 7 bets in
all. We will pay you for one of these 7 bets. We will pick this bet at random after all bets
are made, and tell you which one will be paid. You should view each bet as if it could be
the one to determine your payoffs, since one of them actually will.
The maximum payoff for your bets today will be $100.
Ping Pong Balls Again
We will now repeat the task with Ping Pong balls a few times.
We have a number of ping pong balls in each of three bingo cages, which we
have labeled Cage A, Cage B and Cage C. Some of the ping pong balls are Orange
and some are White. We will roll each bingo cage and you can decide for yourself what
fraction of Orange balls you think are in the cage.  Of course, the balls will be rolling
around, and you may not be able to tell exactly how many Orange balls are in the cage.
You will be asked to bet on the color of one ping pong ball, selected at random after you
all place your bets. For example, if there are 20 Orange balls and 80 White balls, the
chance of an Orange ball being picked at random is 20 ÷ 100, or 20%.
We will do this task 3 times, with 3 different bingo cages. Just be sure that you
check which cage you are placing a bet on. You can see this listed in the top left corner
of your screen, where it refers to Cage A, Cage B or Cage C. We will show you each
cage one at a time, and allow you to place your bets after we show it to you.
Do you have any questions?
The Eyes Test
At the beginning of today’s experimental session we asked you to answer 36
questions, called The Eyes Test. These questions were designed by psychologists to
measure a person’s ability to “read someone else’s mind” by just looking at their eyes.
Each and everyone of you were given the same 36 Eyes Test questions in
today’s experiment and a total score was recorded for each and every one of you in this
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experiment.
Now we come to the outcome we want you to place bets on in this portion of the
experiment. We will pick one man and one woman in the room. Do you think the man
who is selected will have a higher score on the Eyes Test than the woman who is
selected? 
After everyone in the experiment has made their bets for this event we will
randomly select one man, and randomly select one woman from this experimental
session. We will use the cards we collected, and sort then into one pile for men and one
pile for women. Each pile will be shuffled, and one card drawn from each pile. We will
then compare the score for the man that is drawn with the score for the woman that is
drawn, and write these scores up on the board for you to see.
We therefore pose the following outcome for you to bet on now:
That the man we select at random will have a higher score
on the Eyes Test than the woman we select at random.
Do you have any questions?
2008 Presidential Elections
We want you to place bets on some questions about the U.S. Presidential
Elections being held in a few weeks:
5. Will the next President of the United States be a Democrat or a Republican?
6. Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 5 or more percentage points
greater than the popular vote for the losing candidate?
7. Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 10 or more percentage points
greater than the popular vote for the losing candidate?
It is important that you understand that the first question is about the outcome of
the Electoral College vote, and not the popular vote. The popular vote is just the sum of
all votes across the United States. We are only referring to the Presidential Election,
and not to any other elections that might occur on the same day.
For the second and third question, we are asking if you think that the winner of
the popular vote will beat the loser by 5 or 10 percentage points or more. For example,
if the winner of the popular vote gets 51% of the vote and the loser gets 49%, then this
is a 2 percentage point difference. If the winner gets 53% and the loser gets 47%, then
this is a 6 percentage point difference.
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The election will be on Tuesday, November 4, 2008. To use a widely respected
public source for the outcome, we will use the New York Times of Friday, November 7,
2008 as the official source used to determine your payoffs. In the event that there is a
drawn out determination of the next President, such as in the 2000 election, we will
delay payments until Inauguration Day, which is on January 20, 2009. 
You will be paid for your bets in checks that will be mailed out on Monday,
November 10, assuming we know who the next President will be at that time.
Please go ahead now and place your bets for this event, unless you have any
questions.
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INSTRUCTIONS (CONTINUED) LOT
This is the final stage of today’s experiment. You will be asked to choose
between lotteries with varying prizes and chances of winning. You will be presented with
a series of lotteries where you will make choices between pairs of them. There are 45
pairs in the series. For each pair of lotteries, you should indicate which of the two
lotteries you prefer to play. You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries
you choose, and will be paid according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should
think carefully about which lotteries you prefer.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries will
look like.  The display on your screen will be bigger and easier to read.
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The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 100. Each number between (and including) 1 and 100 is equally likely to
occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice.
In the above example the left lottery pays five dollars ($5) if the number on the
dice that is rolled is between 1 and 40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is
between 41 and 100. The yellow color in the pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area
and illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 1 and 40
and your prize will be $5. The black area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of the
area and illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 41
and 100 and your prize will be $15. 
We have selected colors for the pie charts such that a darker color indicates a
higher prize. White will be used when the prize is zero dollars ($0).
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the number
on the dice rolled is between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 51
and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 91 and 100. As with the
lottery on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the possible numbers which
yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice is 10% of the total pie.
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each
screen, you should indicate which of the lotteries you prefer to play by clicking on one of
the three boxes beneath the lotteries. You should click the LEFT box if you prefer the
lottery on the left, the RIGHT box if you prefer the lottery on the right, and the DON’T
CARE box if you do not prefer one or the other.
You should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the one out of the 45 that you
will play out. If you chose DON’T CARE in the lottery pair that we play out, you will pick
one using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the left lottery and the
numbers 6-10 to the right lottery.
After you have worked through all of the pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and an
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which pair
of lotteries that will be played out. You roll the die until a number between 1 and 45
comes up, and that is the lottery pair to be played. If you picked DON’T CARE for that
pair, you will use the 10-sided die to decide which one you will play. Finally, you will roll
the two 10-sided dice to determine the outcome of the lottery you chose.
For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the above example. If
the random number you rolled was 37, you would win $5; if it was 93, you would get
$15. If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $5; if it
was 93, you would get $15.
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things:
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 45 such pairs
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using the two 10-sided die;
• by which lottery you selected, the left or the right, for that pair; and
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided die.
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best lottery in each pair, because
none of the lotteries are necessarily better than the others. Which lotteries you prefer is
a matter of personal taste. The people next to you will have different lotteries in front of
them when you make your choices, and may have different tastes, so their responses
should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking
carefully about each lottery.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $5 show-up fee that you receive
just for being here and any earnings from the previous stage.
We will now come around to your computer and get you started. When you are
finished, please signal someone to come around to play out your lottery and record your
earnings. As soon as you have finished the actual series, and after you have rolled the
necessary dice, you will be asked to check with someone in the next room to make sure
that your earnings sheet is complete, and then you will be paid. You are then free to go.
Thanks again for your participation today!
17 For example, one could elicit the p that makes the subject indifferent between a lottery paying M
with probability p and m with probability p, for M>m, and a lottery paying M if the event occurs and m if it
does not (Marschak [1964; p. 107ff.]). This method formally requires that one elicit indifference, which raises
procedural issues.
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Appendix B: Related Literature
A. Theory
The notion that subjective probabilities can be usefully viewed as prices at which one might
trade has been a common one in statistics, and is associated with de Finetti [1937][1970] and Savage
[1971]. It is also clear, of course, in the vast literature on gambling, particularly on the setting of odds
by bookies and parimutuel markets (Epstein [1977; p. 298ff.]). The central insight is that a subjective
probability is a marginal rate of substitution between contingent claims, where the contingency is the
event that the probability refers to. There are then a myriad of ways in which one can operationalize
this notion of a marginal rate of substitution.17
The formal link between scoring rules and optimizing decisions by agents is also familiar,
particularly in Savage [1971], Kadane and Winkler [1987][1988] and Hanson [2003]. Jose, Nau, and
Winkler [2008] stress the interpretation of several popular scoring rules from the perspective of an
expected utility maximizing agent with preferences derived from familiar utility functions. Their
approach may be viewed as complementary to ours: if one knows the utility function of the agent,
they show which scoring rule is incentive compatible. We start with an arbitrary utility function and
belief betting game, which can be viewed as derived from a particular scoring rule, and draw
statistical inferences about subjective beliefs.
Karni [2009] proposes a procedure that has the considerable advantage of eliciting true
reports of subjective probabilities without requiring corrections for risk attitudes. The procedure is
akin to the utility elicitation procedure of Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964] and the probability
elicitation procedure of Marschak [1964], but with an innovative twist. Let there be two prizes, x>y.
18 A spreadsheet with these calculations is available on request.
19 One might apply the procedure over “points” and then convert earnings of points into currency in
a non-linear way so as to sharpen incentives, but at the risk of an additional layer to the complexity of the
explaining the procedure to subjects.
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The subject reports a probability >, and a random number . is selected from the unit interval. If . $
> the subject gets the lottery that pays off x if the event occurs, and y otherwise; if . < > the subject
gets the lottery that pays off x with probability . and y with probability 1-.. If the agent is not
satiated, and is probabilistically sophisticated, it is a dominant strategy to report the true subjective
probability as >. The main problem is that this class of procedures is known to have very poor
incentive properties in practice (Harrison [1992]). For example, assume that x=$100 and y=$0,
which is the range of prizes used in our scoring rule experiments, let the number . be selected from
a uniform distribution on the unit interval, and let the true subjective probability be ¾. Taking 4,000
random draws from this distribution, the average payoff from reporting the truth is $78.825.18 But
the expected earnings from reporting 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1 is $49.48,
$56.90, $63.70, $68.10, $72.53, $75.65, $77.63, $78.58, $78.83, $77.45 and $75.23, respectively. This
implies expected losses of $3.18, $1.20, $0.25, $0 and $1.38 from reports of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9,
respectively. These are small incentives for responding truthfully. To be sure, they are positive (or
they are at greater decimal accuracy than reported here), which is all that is needed for the theoretical
result. But they pose potential behavioral problems for encouraging truthful and accurate
responses.19 The upshot is a tradeoff worth further investigation empirically: is the advantage of not
having to elicit risk attitudes, and then correct scoring rule responses for them, worth the loss in the
strength of incentives to report truthfully and accurately? Theory cannot answer this question.
B. Experiments
Experimental economists have used several of the popular scoring rules, but with one
20 Hanson [1996] contains some important corrections to some of the claims about QSR elicitation in
McKelvey and Page [1990].
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notable exception discussed below, none have corrected for any deviation from risk neutrality.
The QSR was apparently first used by McKelvey and Page [1990], and later by Offerman,
Sonnemans and Schram [1996], McDaniel and Rutström [2001], Nyarko and Schotter [2002],
Schotter and Sopher [2003], Rutström and Wilcox [2006] and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
[2007].20 In each case the subject is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be risk-neutral. Schotter and
Sopher [2003; p. 504] recognize the role of risk aversion, but appear to argue that it is not a factor
behaviorally:
It can easily be demonstrated that this reward function provides an incentive for
subjects to reveal their true beliefs about the actions of their opponents. Telling the
truth is optimal; however, this is true only if the subjects are risk neutral. Risk
aversion can lead subjects to make a “secure” prediction and place a .50 probability
of each strategy. We see no evidence of this type of behavior.
Of course, evidence of subjects selected the probability report of ½ only shows that the subject has
extreme risk aversion. The absence of that extreme evidence says nothing about the role that risk
aversion might play in general.
Scoring rules that are linear in the absolute deviation of the estimate have been used by
Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] and Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair [2007]. Croson [2000] and Hurley
and Shogren [2005] used scoring rules that are linear in the absolute deviation as well as providing a
bonus for an exactly correct prediction. It is well-known that linear scoring rules elicit the median of
the subjective predictive distribution for a risk-neutral agent, and of course this will also be the mean
and mode if the distribution is unimodal and symmetric.
Scoring rules that provide a positive reward for an “exact” prediction and zero otherwise
have been used by Charness and Dufwenberg [2006] and Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-
Schmidt [2007]. In each case the inferential objective has been to test hypotheses drawn from
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“psychological game theory,” which rest entirely on making operational the beliefs of players in
strategic games. In the former study the “exact” prediction of a probability was defined as an
estimate within 5 percentage points of the true outcome; in the latter study the estimates were over
41 finite contribution levels in a public good, so the prediction had to be the correct integer to
receive the reward. It is easy to show that this scoring rule elicits the mode for a risk-neutral agent. In
the case of contributions to a public good this is not at all likely to be a unimodal and symmetric
distribution, given the expectation of a significant spike at the zero contribution level implied by
perfect free-riding (e.g., see the histograms displayed in Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt
[2007; Appendix B]). The rationale for this scoring rule, rather than the QSR, is provided by
Charness and Dufwenberg [2006; p.1586]:
Overall, we chose our belief-elicitation protocol mainly because it is simple and
rather easy to describe in instructions. [...] Our idea is to get a rough-but-meaningful
ballpark estimate of participants’ degrees of belief.
We certainly accept that the QSR can be difficult to explain to subjects if one relies on explicit
payoff tables showing the mapping from reports to payoffs, but do not know what the phrase
“rough-but-meaningful ballpark estimate” means: either we take the incentives to report beliefs
seriously, or we do not.
Most experimental economists embed the elicitation of probabilities in another experimental
task that the subject is undertaking. Indeed, one of the hypotheses being studied is whether the
effort to elicit beliefs will encourage players in a game to think more strategically (Croson [2000],
Rutström and Wilcox [2006], Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker [2007]). Of course, this violates the “no
stakes condition” required for the QSR to elicit beliefs reliably unless one assumes that the subject is
risk neutral. Only one study employs a “spectator” treatment in which players are asked to provide
beliefs but do not take part in the constituent game determining the event outcome: study #2 of
21 The need for some correction is also recognized by Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [1996;
p.824, fn.8] and Rutström and Wilcox [2007; p.11, fn.8].
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Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [1996].
The most serious concern with the experimental implementations of scoring rules is that the
rewards are very, very small. For example, Nyarko and Schotter [2002] and Rutström and Wilcox
[2006] gave each subject an endowment of 10 cents, from which their penalties are to be deducted.
So the effect of the scoring rule is literally defined in terms of fractions of pennies, and the
additional rewards are not very substantial for optimal reports as compared to reports near the
optimum. Whatever position one takes on the issue of “flat payoff functions” raised by Von
Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986] and Harrison [1989], these rewards for accuracy are disappointing. 
C. Econometrics
Our statistical approach uses the notion of joint estimation of preference parameters from
several complementary experimental tasks, such as applied in other experimental settings by
Harrison and Rutström [2008; p.100ff.] and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008]. One
insight from this joint estimation approach is that uncertainty about the core parameters of utility
functions and/or probability weighting functions affects inferences that can be made about behavior
in risk-related domains, as they should.
Only one study attempts to recover elicited beliefs from observed choices, calibrating for
non-linear utility functions and/or probability weighting: Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and
Wakker [2007; §6].21 They provide a statement of some alternative ways in which this recovery could
be undertaken, essentially the method we use, and then propose a new method. Like us, they
consider the recovery of true subjective beliefs when the agent may be risk averse in the narrow
sense of EUT, as well as the broader sense implied by an allowance for probability weighting. Their
22 On the other hand, if one uses other elicitation procedures, such as the Trade-Off design of
Wakker and Deneffe [1996], Fennema and van Assen [1999], Abdellaoui [2000] and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt
and Paraschiv [2007], then the procedures can indeed become laborious for the subject. There are other
reasons not to use these methods, the most significant of which is their lack of incentive compatibility as
conventionally applied (Harrison and Rutström [2008; §1.5]). But these methods are not needed, and the
stated concerns with this approach to recovering subjective beliefs are not substantial.
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preferred approach has a reduced form simplicity, and is actually agnostic about which structural
model of decision making under risk one uses. Our approach is explicitly structural, and generates
inferences about subjective beliefs that are conditional on the assumed model of decision making
under risk. We see these as complementary approaches, and both have strengths and weaknesses.
One method they consider is by estimating or eliciting the functional forms of a model of
choice under risk (e.g., EUT, RDU or CPT), then observing beliefs over a natural event in some
task, and econometrically recovering the implied subjective beliefs by using the estimated model of
choice under risk to “back out” the subjective probability that must have been used in the belief
elicitation task. They dismiss this approach, which is the one we follow. They claim, without further
discussion, that estimating or eliciting the functional forms is “laborious” and that it involves
“complex multi-parameter estimations.” It is certainly true that the joint likelihood involves several
parameters, but such estimation is standard fare with maximum likelihood modeling, so that is
hardly a concern (unless one wants to avoid writing out customized likelihoods). It is not clear in
what sense this is a “complex” undertaking. The labor involved depends on how one undertakes the
estimation or elicitation. In our case the subjects need to do one task, which consists of 60 binary
choices over lotteries, and then all of the labor involved is by the computer estimating maximum
likelihood models that have been well-studied for years (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; §2] for a
survey).22
The empirical method they use instead has an attractive reduced form simplicity. For a given
subject, it uses the QSR to elicit reported probabilities for naturally occurring events, and then uses
23 So there is no allowance for subjects to make decision errors in the calibration task, or the
elicitation task for the naturally occurring event for that matter. These errors could be subsumed into some
sampling error on estimates of R(B(N)) as an empirical function of N, but then one is relying on the errors
being well-behaved statistically. In fact, Offerman et al. [2007; equation (8.3)] do allow for an additive error
term which they assume to be truncated normal to ensure that reported probabilities lie between 0 and 1.
Their pooled estimates indicate that there is a need for some correction for non-linear utility, but that it is not
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the QSR in a calibration task to elicit a “risk correction function” that allows them to recover the
subjective probability that generated the report for the naturally occurring event. The risk correction
function simply elicits reports for “objective probabilities,” such as the chance that a single roll of a
100-sided die will come up between 1 and 25. Assume the subject report 0.30 for this event. Then, if
the subject ever reported a 0.30 in the initial task for the naturally occurring event, they would infer
that he had a subjective probability of 0.25 underlying it, since that was the objective probability that
generated this report using the (same) scoring rule. Thus the difference between the report of 0.30 in
the calibration task and the true underlying probability is attributed solely to the effects of non-linear
utility and/or probability weighting. By eliciting a risk correction function for a wide range of
probabilities, and with a sufficiently fine grid, one can recover any report with some reasonable
accuracy.
This approach is attractive, and avoids the need for the researcher to “take a stand” on
which model of choice under uncertainty determines betting behavior. To see the key assumption
underlying their approach, let N be the actuarial  probability that the calibration event will occur. For
some artefactual events, such as tossing coins and rolling die, N is well defined, but for other events
it is not so well defined. Let B(N) be the function that summarizes the subjective belief that the
subject actually holds that the calibration event will occur, and let R(B(N)) be the function
transforming B(N) into a report using the QSR, or any appropriate scoring rule. Offerman et al.
[2007] first assume that B(N) = N in the calibration task, so that the only reason that R(B(N)) … N is
that the subject has non-linear utility and/or undertakes probability weighting.23  Why might B(N) …
so clear that probability weighting is an issue (the log-likelihood for row #1 in their Table 9.1, which allows
for both effects, is virtually identical to the log-likelihood for row #5, in which no probability weighting is
assumed). Although they allow for errors to vary with an incentives treatment applied between-subjects, it
would be useful to extend their statistical analysis of the pooled data to allow for correlated errors at the level
of the individual subject, rather than implicitly assume homoskedasticity.
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N, for such simple tasks? Apart from concerns with loaded die, or certain cultures imbuing
randomizing devices or colors on chips with some animist intent, we would be concerned with
psychological editing processes based on similarity relations. To take a simplistic example, someone
might “round down” to the nearest increment of 0.05 or 0.10 and then decide how to report using
this subjectively edited probability B(N) as the basis for any adjustments due to non-linear utility or
probability weighting. Is the actuarial probability N the one we really want to compare R(B(N)) to in
such a case, or is it B(N)?
This might seem to be nit-picking when it comes to the rolling of a 100-sided die in the
calibration task, and perhaps viewed as part of a latent structural psychological story underlying the
idea of probability weighting. But it is surely more significant for naturally occurring events. Here is
where the second assumption comes in: that B(N) = N in the belief elicitation task where N is defined
(or not) over naturally occurring events. Thus, what if we accept that B(N) = N is a reasonable
assumption for the calibration task with the artefactual event, but cannot be so sure for the task with
the naturally occurring event? Our position is that we are recovering B(N), “warts and all” in terms
of how the subject conceives of the event and defines the probability N. Offerman et al. [2007]
would appear to be recovering the “touched up” image of B(N), N, after the warts have been
removed.
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Appendix C. Additional Statistical Results
Table C1: Estimates of the Utility Function Under EUT
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
A. No Covariates
r 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.36
" 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04
: 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08
B. Adding Covariates
r
Constant 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.35
female Female 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.28
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.09 0.10 0.37 -0.11 0.29
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.05 0.09 0.57 -0.13 0.23
Graduate Graduate Student -0.16 0.12 0.17 -0.40 0.07
"
Constant 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
female Female 0.02 0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.05
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.02 0.04
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.00 0.02 0.96 -0.03 0.03
Graduate Graduate Student 0.00 0.02 0.95 -0.03 0.03
: 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08
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Table C2: Estimates of the Utility Function Under RDU
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Variable Description Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
A. No Covariates
r 0.49 0.05 0.00 0.39 0.58
" 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.12
( 0.72 0.06 0.00 0.60 0.83
: 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.09
B. Adding Covariates
r
Constant 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.31 0.58
female Female 0.08 0.10 0.93 -0.18 0.20
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.02 0.15 0.87 -0.28 0.33
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.07 0.10 0.48 -0.12 0.26
Graduate Graduate Student 0.18 0.25 0.46 -0.30 0.67
"
Constant 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.09
female Female -0.01 0.04 0.82 -0.08 0.06
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.03 0.08 0.72 -0.12 0.18
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 0.07 0.07 0.30 -0.06 0.21
Graduate Graduate Student 0.29 0.37 0.42 -0.42 1.01
(
Constant 0.72 0.07 0.00 0.59 0.86
female Female 0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.05 0.35
Over22 Over 22 Years of age 0.05 0.25 0.85 -0.45 0.54
GPAhi GPA great than 3.75 -0.09 0.13 0.46 -0.34 0.16
Graduate Graduate Student -0.47 0.41 0.25 -1.28 0.33
: 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.08
